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CASE NOTES
ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW-Freedom
of Information
Act-Renegotiation Procedures Will Not Be Temporarily
Stayed While a Controversy Over the Status of Documents
Under the Information Act is Settled. Renegotiation Board v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
Under authority of the Renegotiation Act of 1951,' the federal government commenced renegotiation of defense contracts made with
three respondent contractors' for the purpose of recapturing allegedly excess profits. In order to negotiate intelligently with the Renegotiation Board and discover the reasons for the Board's initial finding of excess profits,' respondents, pursuant to the Freedom of Infor1. Renegotiation Act of 1951, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1211-33 (1970), as amended,
(Supp. III, 1973). Under the authority of section 1215, the Renegotiation
Board promulgated numerous regulations governing the procedure determining excess profits. 32 C.F.R. § 1472.3 (1974) states that the first step
is a conference between the contractor and personnel from a Regional
Renegotiation Board in an attempt to reach an agreement on the amount
of excess profits. If the contractor disagrees with the determination of the
representative of the Regional Board, a second conference is held with a
panel of the Regional Board. This panel meets with the contractor and
submits its recommendations to the Regional Board as to the amount of
excess profits. This recommendation may be more or less than the original
determination. The Regional Board then makes its recommendation. If
the contractor remains dissatisfied he can make a third appeal to the
Renegotiation Board itself. A division of the Board conducts a de novo
study of the case and gives its recommendations to the Board. The Board
then makes its determination of the amount of excess profits, which again
may be more or less than any of the previous determinations. One more
attempt is made to persuade the contractor to accept this determination
voluntarily. If the contractor refuses, a final order is made as to the extent
of excess profits. The contractor has a right to yet one more appeal, to the
Court of Claims. 50 U.S.C. § 1218 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973).
The Court of Claims examines the controversy de novo and issues its
determination as to the amount of excess profits, which again may be more
or less than any of the previous determinations. Id.
2. The respondent contractors were Bannercraft Clothing Co., Astro
Communication Laboratory, and David P. Lilly Co. Renegotiation Bd. v.
Bannercraft Clothing Co., 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
3. The contractors 'claimed the documents were crucial if they were to
bargain intelligently at the outset of the administrative process. Id. at 5.
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mation Act,4 requested disclosure of the various relevant documents
relied upon by the Board. Citing four specific exemptions in the
Information Act, the Board withheld most of the information requested . Respondents successfully sued in the,District Court of the
District of Columbia to enjoin further renegotiation proceedings
until the status of the requested documents was determined.' Upon
4. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended by
(Supp. III, 1973), and 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Pamphlet Feb. 1975), makes
available to the public various documents under the control of government
agencies. Documents are basically divided into three groups. Under section
552(a)(1), descriptions of organization, methods, procedures, forms, instructions as to the scope of all papers, reports, substantive rules of general
applicability adopted as authorized by law, and statements of general
policy must be published in the Federal Register. Section 552(a)(2) states
that final opinions, statements of policy, administrative staff manuals,
and instructions to staff that affect the public are to be made available for
public inspection. The agencies are required to keep a current index of
their orders and opinions open to the public. Section 552(a)(3) provides
that the remaining agency records be made available to the public upon
request for "identifiable records." There are nine expressly exempt categories in the Act. See note 5 infra.
5. 415 U.S. at 6 n.4. The Board relied upon four of the nine expressly
exempt categories under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1970), which states in pertinent
part: "This section does not apply to matters that are

. .

. (3) specifically

exempted from disclosure by statute; (4) trade secrets and commercial or
financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential; (5) inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or letters which would
not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with
the agency . . . (7) investigatory files compiled for law enforcement pur-

poses except to the extent available by law to a party other than an agency
. ...

"

The other five exemptions in the Freedom of Information Act are

for those documents that are "(1) specifically required by Executive order
to be kept secret in the interest of the national defense or foreign policy;
(2) related solely to the internal personnel rules and practices of an
agency. .

.

. (6) personnel and medical files and similar files the disclo-

sure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy

. .

. (8) contained in or related to examination, operating, or con-

dition reports prepared by, on behalf of, or for the use of an agency responsible for the regulation or supervision of financial institutions; or (9) geological and geophysical information and data, including maps, concerning
wells." Id.
6. Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Board, Civ. No. 1340
(D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 466 F.2d 345 (D.C. Cir. 1972), rev'd and remanded,
415 U.S. 1 (1974).
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consolidation of the cases, the court of appeals affirmed, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies being considered inapplicable.' The Supreme Court reversed and remanded,8 holding
that the Freedom of Information Act could not be used to interfere
with a Renegotiation Board proceeding prior to termination of its
administrative hearings and all further administrative remedies.'
The Freedom of Information Act of 1966 was enacted to close
many of the gaps that had previously existed in the public information provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).10 The
APA had become ineffective due to its vague exemptions" and lack
of any remedy when information was wrongfully withheld." The
purpose of the Information Act is to give the public prompt access
to identifiable records'" of federal administrative agencies with min7. Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 360
(D.C. Cir. 1972).
8. 415 U.S. 1 (1974) (5-4 decision).
9. Id. at 24-25.
10. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, § 3, 60 Stat. 238 (1946)
(codified at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1970), as amended by (Supp. III, 1973), and 5
U.S.C.A. § 552 (Pamphlet Feb. 1975)).
11. For representative cases on the vagueness of the exemptions, see
Symposium -Access to Government Information, 68 Nw. U.L. REV. 184,
188-89 (1974). H. R. REP. No. 1497, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1965) stated: "In
a sense, 'public information' is a misnomer for 5 U.S.C. § 1002, since the
section permits withholding of Federal agency records if secrecy is required
'in the public interest' or if the records relate 'solely to the internal management of an agency.' Government information also may be held confidential 'for good cause found.' Even if no good cause can be found for
secrecy, the records will be made available only to 'persons properly and
directly concerned.' Neither in the Administrative Procedure Act nor its
legislative history are these broad phrases defined, nor is there a recognition of the basic right of any person-not just those special classes 'properly and directly concerned'-to gain access to the records of official
Government actions. Above all, there is no remedy available to a citizen
who has been wrongfully denied access to the Government's public records.
The present statute, therefore, is not in any realistic sense a public information statute."
12. See EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
13. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973) states:
"Except with respect to the records made available under paragraphs (1)
and (2) of this subsection, each agency, on request for identifiable records
. . . shall make the records promptly available to any person." See Long
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imal difficulty.' 4
When an agency fails to produce requested documents, the party
seeking production may commence an action in district court to
compel disclosure.' 5 The agency has the burden of proving that the
documents fall within one of nine statutory exemptions.' 6 Proceedings to compel disclosure are given preference in a court's docket
and are to be expedited in every practical way, except as to causes
the court considers of greater importance.' 7
Despite the Act's policy of requiring exemptions to be narrowly
construed,'" several courts have broadened their scope or even crev. IRS, 349 F. Supp. 871 (W.D. Wash. 1972): "The purpose of the Freedom
of Information Act is to expand citizen access to government information
with a minimum of difficulity." Id. at 873.
14. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973) provides
that if the documents are refused, a district court can order their production, and "[e]xcept as to causes the court considers of greater importance,
proceedings before the district court, as authorized by this paragraph, take
precedence on the docket over all other causes and shall be assigned for
hearing and trial at the earliest practicable date and expedited in every
way."
15. Id. Cognizant of the adamancy of administrative agencies in protecting their documents that substantially prevent people from "arm[ing]
themselves with the power knowledge gives," Congress clearly recognized
that "a government of secrecy benefits no one." S. REP. No. 813, 89th
Cong., 1st Sess. 2-3, 10 (1965), excerpt reprinted in 111 CONG. REC. 2682123 (1965).
16. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973). The
exemptions are to be narrowly construed. Stokes v. Brennan, 476 F.2d 699
(5th Cir. 1973); Fisher v. Renegotiation Bd., 473 F.2d 109 (D.C. Cir. 1972);
Tennessean Newspapers Inc. v. FHA, 464 F.2d 657 (6th Cir. 1972); Consumers Union of the United States, Inc. v. Veterans Admin., 301 F. Supp.
786 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
17. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. HII,1973).
18. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Wellford v.
Hardin, 444 F.2d 21, 25 (4th Cir. 1971).
19. See Frankel v. SEC, 460 F.2d 813 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
889 (1972) where it was held that documents collected for investigation
purposes were exempt under 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7) (1970) even after the
investigation was closed, and EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973), where the
Supreme Court denied judicial inspection of documents classified as secret.
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ated new ones.19 In EPA v. Mink,'" documents prepared for the
President concerning a scheduled underground nuclear test were
claimed to be exempt under executive order."' The Supreme Court
held that Congress had specifically provided for the Executive to
classify documents as "Top Secret and Secret" and thus prevent
judicial review."2 Previously, a document classified as secret by executive order could be examined by a court so that factual material
would be disclosed while material on questions of law and policy was
exempt. 3 Mink held that in camera inspection by the court of the
requested material was no longer automatic. 4 An agency now would
be given "the opportunity, by means of detailed affidavits or oral
testimony, to establish to the satisfaction of the district court that
the documents sought fall clearly beyond the range of material that
would be available to a private party in litigation with the
agency." 5 The Court thus expanded the exemption which had been
20. 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
21. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1) (1970) exempts documents "specifically required by Executive order to be kept secret in the interest of the national
defense or foreign policy . ..."

22. 410 U.S. at 84. The Court's broad construction of the exemption is
especially surprising in view of New York Times v. United States, 403 U.S.
713 (1971), which upheld the appellants' right under the first amendment
to publish the contents of a classified study entitled "History of United
States Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy" (commonly known
as the Pentagon Papers). The Court stated that "[a]ny prior restraint
on expression comes to this Court with a 'heavy presumption' against its
constitutional validity." Id. at 723, quoting Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971). The government thus carries a heavy
burden of showing justification for the enforcement of such a restraint. Id.
See also note 25 infra. But, freedom of the press does not specifically confer
upon these people a "right to know." Johnson & Marmoek, Classification
and the Right to Know, 17 N.Y.L.F. 814, 818 (1971).
23. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1079-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
24. 410 U.S. at 89.
25. Id. at 93. Perhaps the Supreme Court has finally recognized the
dangers of the "executive order" exemption being expanded too far, and
has started narrowing its interpretation of it-at least in criminal cases.
In United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), the President sought to
withhold from a grand jury tape recordings and documents relating to his
conversations with aides and advisors. He claimed an absolute privilege,
absent an executive order, to withhold confidential communications be-
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narrowed in earlier cases.2" More properly, the Court should have
placed a heavy burden of proof on the agency or executive branch
to justify "secrecy" for national defense or foreign affairs purposes.27
This possibly would have satisfied the narrow construction of the
exemptions requirement of the Information Act.
The Supreme Court, in RenegotiationBoard v. Bannercraft Clothing Co. ,2"continued this protective policy by requiring exhaustion
of administrative remedies under the Renegotiation Act before the
Information Act could be invoked. 9 The Court first considered
whether the district courts had jurisdiction under the Act to enjoin
agency proceedings pending resolution of an Information Act
claim.3 The court of appeals had answered affirmatively, justifying
the use of the equitable power as a procedural tool to implement the
tween high government officials and their aides and advisors, and a privilege based on separation of powers. Id. at 702-16. The Court rejected both
claims, ruling that "when the privilege depends solely on the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with other values arises. Absent a claim of need to
protect military, diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, we find
it difficult to accept the argument that even the very important interest
in confidentiality of Presidential communications is significantly diminished by production of such material for in camera inspection with all the
protection that a district court will be obliged to provide." Id. at 706. The
same political environment prompted Congress to act. On Nov. 21, 1974,
Congress overrode President Ford's veto and amended the Information Act
to allow for in camera review by judges of national security claims, further
limited investigatory-agency exemptions to ongoing technicians and cases
only, and required the agency to pay the attorney fees of a successful
litigant. 5 U.S.C.A. § 552 (Pamphlet Feb. 1975), amending 5 U.S.C. § 552
(1970).
26. 410 U.S. at 89 n.16.
27. Federal courts have been less timid when confronted with executive
claims of privilege, and have used mandamus to obtain documents and in
camera inspection to separate national secrets from national scandals. In
Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (1974), it was stated: "'Any claim to executive absolutism cannot override the duty of the court to assure that an
official has not exceeded his charter or flouted the legislative will.' "Id. at
714, quoting Committee for Nuclear Responsibility, Inc. v. Seaborg, 463
F.2d 788, 793 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
28. 415 U.S. 1 (1974).
29. Id. at 20.
30. Id. at 16.

CASE NOTES

1975]

Act.3' The dissent in the court of appeals had argued that "the
narrow, specific remedy" of the injunction was authorized only in
Information Act cases against an agency improperly withholding
nonexempt material.2 This "narrow remedy," however, could not
be expanded to enjoin agency proceedings." The dissent further
noted the lack of case authority in a situation where:
[A] civil suit seeking enforcement of a statutory right wholly independent
of and unrelated to any issues involved in an ongoing administrative proceeding has resulted in an order in the course of that litigation staying or otherwise interfering with the agency's proceedings."

Consequently, the dissent concluded that the resolution of an Information Act claim was unrelated to the issues in the agency proceed35
ing.
The Supreme Court in Bannercraftdiscussed the general rules for
determining a court's remedial jurisdiction. 8 The first line of cases
cited by the Court 3 limited courts' jurisdiction and stood for the
proposition that "where a statute creates a right and provides a
special remedy, that remedy is exclusive. 31 8 The leading case is
United States v. Babcock.3 9 There, two military officers made
claims against the United States under the authority of a statute
which waived sovereign immunity when private property belonging
to military personnel was "lost or destroyed in the military serv31.
(D.C.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 353
Cir. 1972).
Id. at 364 (dissenting opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
415 U.S. at 18-19. The language in the Information Act that was

under inspection was "the district court.

. .

has jurisdiction to enjoin the

agency from withholding agency records and to order the production of any
agency records improperly withheld from the complaint." 5 U.S.C. §
552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. 111, 1973). The Board's position was
that only this specific remedy-ordering production-was available to the
courts. The plaintiffs argued the inherent equitable powers of the court
were in no way impaired by this language. 415 U.S. at 18-19.
37. 415 U.S. at 18-19.
38.

United States v. Babcock, 250 U.S. 328, 331 (1919).

39.

250 U.S. 328 (1919).
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The statute provided that accounting officers of the

Treasury Department were to determine the amount of such loss.
Their decision, in the words of the statute, was to be "held as finally
determined, and shall never thereafter be reopened or considered."'"
Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the court of claims lacked
jurisdiction to hear the case since the remedy was with the Treasury
Department, not the courts. 2 This rule has been continually applied
where a right created by statute granted a specific remedy and
where a statute limited public suits to specific cases.4
The Court also cited a second principle-that the district courts
have full equitable powers to protect a right created by statute when
there is no limitation put on that power by the statute. 4 In Porter
40. Id. at 330. The accounting officers had ruled that Babcock's losses
were "not caused by any exigency of the service, nor from a cause incident
to or produced by the military service," and hence denied relief. Id. at 329.
41. Id. at 331.
42. Id.
43. See Switchman's Union of North America v. National Mediation
Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943), where a dispute arose over which labor organization was to represent the employees of a carrier for collective bargaining
purposes. After holding an election the National Mediation Board certified
one organization. The other union sought a cancellation of the certification
in a federal court. The Supreme Court ruled the district court lacked
jurisdiction to review the Board's action. The right created by the statute
granted a specific remedy for its protection in the Board. Consequently, a
review by federal courts was not necessary to protect that "right." Id. at
301. Similarly, in National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. National Ass'n of R.R.
Passengers, 414 U.S. 453 (1974), a statute provided that the Attorney
General would prosecute any violations of the Rail Passenger Service Act
of 1970 (Amtrak Act), 45 U.S.C. §§ 501-644 (1970). Standing for public
suits was "explicitly limited to a 'case involving a labor agreement.'" 414
U.S. at 457. While the Court in Babcock and Switchman had no jurisdiction, the Court in National Railroad had jurisdiction to decide any case
brought by the Attorney General, but had jurisdiction to decide cases
brought by members of the public only in cases involving labor disputes.
44. The broad equitable powers are usually seen as historic in nature
and inherent in the power of the courts. However, some cases find justification in the All Writs Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970) states: "The Supreme
Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all writs
necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages and principles of law." See FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384
U.S. 597 (1966).
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v. Warner Holding Co.," a suit was brought under the Emergency
Price Control Act of 194248 to enjoin the defendant from collecting
excess rents and to gain restitution for rents that had already been
paid in excess of the legal maximums. 7 The Supreme Court held
that "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute, all the inherent equitable powers of the District Court are available for the proper and
complete exercise of that jurisdiction."4 Here, the statute provided
that the court could issue "a permanent or temporary injunction,
restraining order, or other order . . . . " The term "other order"
was deemed to have anticipated the use of the courts' equitable
jurisdiction in fashioning remedies. 0
The Supreme Court went a step further in Scripps-HowardRadio,
Inc. v. FCC,5 where the power of the court of appeals to issue a stay
under the Communications Act of 19342 was challenged, the statute
being silent as to the courts' jurisdiction. The Supreme Court refused to infer a denial of the general grant of auxiliary powers to the
federal courts. 3 "Where Congress wished to deprive the courts of
this historic power, it knew how to use apt words." 4 Moreover, when
a limitation was put on a court's equitable power, it was narrowly
construed. 5 In Mitchell v. Robert DeMarioJewelry, Inc. , the Su45. 328 U.S. 395 (1946).
46. 56 Stat. 23, 33 (1943).
47. 328 U.S. at 396-97.
48. Id. at 398. "Unless a statute in so many words, or by a necessary
and inescapable inference, restricts the court's jurisdiction in equity, the
full scope of that jurisdiction is to be recognized and applied." Id.
49. Id. at 397.
50. Id. at 399.
51. 316 U.S. 4 (1942).
52. 48 Stat. 1064, 1093 (1935) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 47
U.S.C.), granted review of appeals of orders granting or denying applications for or the renewal of licenses for the construction of radio stations,
including the power to issue stays. In some cases, however, appeals went
directly to the District of Columbia Circuit. The statute was silent as to
the remedial jurisdiction of the appellate court. 316 U.S. at 8.
53. Id. at 11.
54. Id. at 17.
55. Mitchell v. Robert DeMario Jewelry, Inc., 361 U.S. 288 (1960).
56. Id.

368
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preme Court was confronted with a provision in the Fair Labor
Standards Act of 1938 which deprived the courts of jurisdiction "in
any action brought by the [Secretary of Labor] . . . to order the
payment to employees of unpaid minimum wages or unpaid overtime compensation or an additional equal amount as liquated damages in such action."57 The employees were obligated to bring a
separate civil action.5" The Supreme Court stated that when Congress authorizes equity courts to enforce a regulatory statute, it
must be assumed that Congress has "acted cognizant of the historic
power of equity to provide complete relief in light of the statutory
purposes." 59 The quoted provision was thus held to apply only to
underpayments of the statutory rates to those still employed, and
not to lost wages incident to a wrongful discharge. 0 Thus, the Court
has insisted on exercising its broad equitable powers when a statute
is broadly worded, as in Porter, when it is silent, as in ScrippsHoward, and when it is possible to read around the limitation, as
in Mitchell. In Bannercraft, the Renegotiation Board argued that
the language of the Information Act"1 limited the jurisdiction of the
courts.2 The Supreme Court disagreed, finding "little to suggest,
despite the Act's primary purpose, that Congress sought to limit the
inherent powers of an equity court." 3 But the Justices rendered this
statement dictum by deciding the case on a different issue. 4
The district courts may not interrupt a proceeding of the
57. Id. at 289, quoting Act of Oct. 26, 1949, ch. 736, § 15, 63 Stat. 919,
as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
58. 361 U.S. at 292.
59. Id. at 292. "The court below took as the touchstone for decision the
principle that to be upheld the jurisdiction here contested 'must be expressly conferred by an act of Congress or be necessarily implied from a
congressional enactment.' In this the court was mistaken." Id. at 290
(citation omitted).
60. Id. at 294-95. The employees in the Mitchell case had been wrongfully discharged. As a result of the Court's narrow interpretation of the
the statute the Secretary of Labor was allowed to collect the lost wages for
the employees. Otherwise, the employees would have had to bring a separate suit.
61. Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658, 671 n.22 (1963).
62. See note 36 supra.
63. 415 U.S. at 20.
64. Id.
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Renegotiation Board, regardless of the Information Act. 5 The Court
decided that because it had never allowed interruptions of the
Board's proceedings in the past, it would not allow them now. 6 The
Information Act would not be permitted to affect the operation of
the Renegotiation Board for any reason. 7
For the proposition that district courts could not interfere with
proceedings of the Renegotiation Board, the Court relied on a trilogy
of cases, decided in the first years of the Renegotiation Act." They
were Aircraft & Diesel Equipment Corp. v. Hirsch,69 Lichter v.
United States,'" and Macauley v. Waterman Steamship Corp.7
In Aircraft, plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment that the Renegotiation Act was unconstitutional and an injunction against further proceedings.72 The action was dismissed because plaintiff failed
to exhaust its administrative remedies (the renegotiation process)
and had an adequate remedy at law (suits against its customers)."
In Lichter, plaintiff failed to make a timely appeal to the Tax
Court.74 Appeal to the Supreme Court, without first appealing to the
Tax Court, was prohibited." In Macauley, plaintiff sought an injunction against further proceedings and a declaratory judgment
that the contracts in dispute were not subject to the Renegotiation
Act. The Supreme Court affirmed dismissal on the grounds that
(4'no one is entitled to judicial relief for a supposed or threatened
injury until the prescribed administrative remedy has been exhausted.' "70
All three cases found support for their holdings in the language
and legislative history of the Renegotiation Act.77 The Act provided
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
by an
75.
76.
77.

Id.
Id. at 22-23.
Id. at 22.
Id.
331 U.S. 752 (1947).
334 U.S. 742 (1948).
327 U.S. 540 (1946).
331 U.S. at 754.
Id. at 756.
334 U.S. at 791-93. Appeal to the Tax Court has now been replaced
appeal to the court of claims. 50 U.S.C. § 1218 (Supp. III, 1973).
334 U.S. at 790.
327 U.S. at 543,
Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 790 (1948); Aircraft & Diesel
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that the court of claims "shall have exclusive jurisdiction, by order,
to determine the amount, if any, of such excessive profits ....
,

The legislative history of the Act also demonstrated that the court
of claims had exclusive jurisdiction to decide questions of fact and
law concerning excess profits.79 In Aircraft and Macauley, the parties attempted to use the courts to bypass and terminate administrative hearings.'" In Lichter, the plaintiff attempted to appeal to a
court which lacked jurisdiction when his time to appeal to the pro8
per court had expired. '

In Bannercraft, plaintiffs were not trying to avoid or terminate
administrative proceedings. Nor were they trying to appeal a final
decision. Rather, respondents were attempting to stay the administrative proceedings temporarily while their rights under the Information Act were determined." The Supreme Court, however, held
that the Information Act was subordinate to the Renegotiation Act's
"purposeful design of negotiation without interruption for judicial
review." 3 Interpreting Mink as holding that the Information Act's
purpose was disclosure to the "public," 84 the Court curiously narrowed that term to exclude the "negotiating self-interested contractor." Thus, the Court excluded private party plaintiffs and would
require agency disclosure only when it will enable the "public" to
become a more educated electorate.86
It appears that the Supreme Court incorrectly relied on the
Aircraft-Lichter-Macauley cases as forbidding any interference by

the judicial branch in Board proceedings.

7 These

earlier cases had

Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 766 (1947); Macauley v. Waterman
S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946).
78. 50 U.S.C. § 1218 (1970), cited in Macauley v. Waterman S.S.
Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946).
79. Aircraft & Diesel Equip. Corp. v. Hirsch, 331 U.S. 752, 766 (1947);
Macauley v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 327 U.S. 540, 544 (1946).
80. See text accompanying notes 72-73, 76 supra.
81. See text accompanying notes 74-75 supra.

82. See text accompanying note 6 supra.
83. 415 U.S. at 22.
84. Id.; see EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973).
85. 415 U.S. at 22.
86. Id. at 20. But cf. Hawkes v. IRS, 467 F.2d 787, 795 (6th Cir. 1972).
87. 415 U.S. at 22.
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come years before passage of the Information Act. 8 Furthermore,
they were concerned with whether federal courts had jurisdiction to
interfere in the Renegotiation Board's administrative proceedings to
settle the question of excess profits on the merits." In Bannercraft,
however, plaintiffs were not asking for a decision on the merits.
Rather, plaintiffs were willing to abide by the requisite administrative procedures. They merely sought information that would allow
them to negotiate intelligently in the early stages of the administrative proceedings, and to evaluate the merits of the Board's position
and the desirability of prolonging the administrative procedures
(and eventually court proceedings).'"
Having decided that the Renegotiation Act's procedures were exclusive on both the merits of the case and the collateral issues of
discovery, the Supreme Court in Bannercraft ruled that failure to
exhaust the administrative remedies of the Renegotiation Act
barred judicial intervention." It ignored the fact that the administrative remedies under the Information Act had been exhausted"
and that the action was brought under the Information Act, not the
Renegotiation Act.93 Focusing on the wrong statute, the Court applied a strict version of the exhaustion doctrine. This doctrine has
its exceptions. 4 To apply it in a rigid fashion is to do an injustice
not only to the rule, but to the parties to the suit. The purpose of
allowing an agency proceeding to continue without judicial interference is to allow it to develop the necessary factual background and
apply its particular expertise to the situation. By allowing the
agency to continue unmolested, it is given a chance to discover and
correct its own errors. None of these purposes was served by denying a stay in this case. The Board had refused to produce the re88. Id. at 30 (dissenting opinion).
89. See text accompanying notes 68-76 supra.
90. 415 U.S. at 30-31 (dissenting opinion).
91. Id. at 20.
92. Id. at 30-31 (dissenting opinion).
93. Id.
94. See McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971); McKart v.
United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); Allen v. Grand Central Aircraft Co.,
347 U.S. 535 (1954).
95. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 193 (1969).
96. Id. at 193-94.
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quested documents. Whether or not there has been an unjustified
refusal was a question properly raised under the Information Act. 7
Since the courts, and not the Board, have developed an expertise
in implementing the Information Act,9" it cannot be said that the
courts are interfering in the exclusive jurisdiction of the Board. 99
Unable to find any irreparable injury to respondents, the Court
believed that, in general, contractors could incur only two disadvantages. Neither disadvantage would justify granting injunctive relief.
The first is uncertainity in the process of negotiating.'"" Far from
constituting irreparable injury, this was seen as an inherent part of
the renegotiation process.'"' The other disadvantage would be increased litigation expenses if contractors appeal. 0 But the mere
expense of litigation has been held not to constitute irreparable
injury." 3 The Court failed to resolve the question of how the contractors were initially expected to formulate an intelligent bargaining
position in the negotiations without benefit of the requested documents. The Court felt that the series of de novo reviews provided
for by the Renegotiation Act, culminating with the court of claims,
was sufficient protection from any injury the plaintiffs might suffer
due to their lack of information. In the court of claims, where
ordinary rules of discovery applied, plaintiffs might eventually be
able to obtain some of the information sought.'"4 Therefore, the
Court reasoned, plaintiffs had an adequate remedy at law.'0 5
Four Justices joined in the Bannercraft dissent.' While agreeing
with the majority's dictum that the courts could fashion the neces97. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973).
98. Id. It is the district courts and not the administrative agencies
which implement the Information Act.
99. 415 U.S. at 31-32 (dissenting opinion).
100. Id. at 24.
101. Id. at 25.
102. Id. at 24.
103. Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41 (1938);
Clark v. Lindeman & Hoverson Co., 88 F.2d 59 (7th Cir. 1937); Bradley
Lumber Co. v. NLRB, 84 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1936).
104. 415 U.S. at 23.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 26 (dissenting opinion of Justice Douglas, with Justices
Marshall, Powell, and Stewart concurring).
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sary equitable remedies in enforcing the Information Act,'" ' they
disagreed with the view that courts could not stay agency proceedings pending settlement of an Information Act claim. 0
The dissent argued that the Aircraft-Lichter-Macauleycases had
been modified by the Information Act.' 00 It criticized the majority's
insulation of the Renegotiation Act from Information Act intrusions.'10 The purpose of the lawsuit was to resolve an Information
Act problem, not a Renegotiation Act problem."' Because administrative remedies under the Information Act had been exhausted, the
courts now had the right to enforce the Information Act to protect
respondents' rights."' Use of the Information Act to determine the
status of the documents would further the purpose of the Renegotiation Act-to resolve disputes in the appropriate agency, not the
courts:
If we take Congress' declaration of purpose seriously, then the parties are
supposed to negotiate over excess profits at the lower administrative levels.
The seemingly endless de novo reviews were intended to make the negotiating
process work, not to provide a substitute for negotiation. If the negotiation
process fails to occur, the opportunity is lost forever. To say that compulsory
awards imposed by the Board or the Court of Claims at the end of the process
provide an adequate remedy is to ignore the difference between an agreement
freely arrived at, as preferred by Congress, and a judgment imposed by a
court of law." 3

According to the dissent, both the Renegotiation Act and the
Information Act mandated a stay while the status of the documents
was determined. The Renegotiation Act required the Board to "endeavor to make an agreement with the contractor . . ." Refusing
to allow respondents to know the basis of the Board's position was
inconsistent with this mandate. Likewise, it was the clear purpose
of the Information Act to "prevent a citizen from losing a controversy with an agency because of some obscure and hidden order or
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
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Bannercraft Clothing Co. v. Renegotiation Bd., 466 F.2d 345, 357

26.
30-31.

(D.C. Cir. 1972).
114. 50 U.S.C. § 1215(a) (1970).
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opinion which the agency knows about but which has been unavailable to the citizen simply because he had no way in which to discover it.""'
By failing to allow enforcement of the Information Act in this
case, the Court limited the effect of the Act and expanded an agency
exemption."' As a result, the Information Act applies only to certain
members of the public, and can only be used after exhaustion of
administrative remedies under the Renegotiation Act."' This makes
the Information Act a "dead letter""' 8 in cases involving renegotiation proceedings. If there are many more decisions like Bannercraft,
it is likely that the entire Information Act will become a "dead
letter."
James P. Donohue, Jr.
115.
116.
117.
118.

S. REP. No. 813, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1965).
See text accompanying notes 84-86 supra.
See text accompanying notes 91-99 supra.
415 U.S. at 26 (dissenting opinion).

